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The safety of nuclear power plants is analyzed by a probabilistic risk assessment, and the
fault tree analysis is the most widely usedmethod for a risk assessment with the event tree
analysis. One of thewell-knowndisadvantages of the fault tree is that drawing a fault tree for
a complex system is a very cumbersome task. Thus, several graphical modeling methods
have been proposed for the convenient and intuitive modeling of complex systems. In this
paper, the reliability graph with general gates (RGGG) method, one of the intuitive graphical
modeling methods based on Bayesian networks, is improved for the reliability analyses of
dynamic systems that have various operation modes with time. A reliability matrix is pro-
posed and it is explained how to utilize the reliabilitymatrix in the RGGG for various cases of
operationmode changes. The proposed RGGGwith a reliabilitymatrix provides a convenient
and intuitive modeling of various operation modes of complex systems, and can also be
utilized with dynamic nodes that analyze the failure sequences of subcomponents. The
combinatorial use of a reliability matrix with dynamic nodes is illustrated through an
application to a shutdown cooling system in a nuclear power plant.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Various studies have been conducted for the development of
safety analysis methods suitable for nuclear power plants.. Seong).
sevier Korea LLC on beha
mons.org/licenses/by-ncThe fault tree analysis is the most widely used method for a
reliability and safety evaluation in the field of safety engi-
neering [1], and the safety of nuclear power plants is esti-
mated using a probabilistic risk assessment method adoptinglf of Korean Nuclear Society. This is an open access article under
-nd/4.0/).
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trees for large and complex systems is usually difficult, time-
consuming, and susceptible to human errors. A fault tree may
not follow a system diagram, and as a result, it may not be
easy to relate the systemflow to the logic that leads to a failure
in the model [4]. Several methods such as the reliability graph
with general gates (RGGG) [5], GO-FLOW [6], and various uses
of Petri nets [7,8] have been proposed for a convenient and
intuitive graphical modeling of complex systems and can be
used as alternatives or complementary methods to the fault
tree analysis.
The conventional fault tree method also has several diffi-
culties in a reliability analysis of dynamic systems. In this
paper, a dynamic system is defined as a system whose failure
is dependent on the failure sequences of subcomponents and/
or that have various operation modes with time. To analyze
dynamic systems, various failure mechanisms with time re-
quirements such as failure orders of the subcomponents and
changes of the system states need to be modeled and quan-
titatively estimated. To overcome the limitations of the con-
ventional static fault tree analysis and model dynamic
systems, two types of dynamic fault trees have been devel-
oped: a dynamic fault tree with dynamic gates [9] and a dy-
namic fault tree with house events [10]. Dugan et al [9]
proposed four dynamic gates to model dynamic systems
whose failures are dependent on the failure sequence of the
subcomponents. The proposed dynamic gates are a
functional-dependency (FDEP) gate, spare gates [cold spare
(CSP), hot spare (HSP), and warm spare (WSP)], a priority AND
gate (PAND), and a sequence-enforcing (SEQ) gate. Cepin and
Mavko [10] introduced house events and a house events ma-
trix to the conventional fault tree to handle various operation
modes and configuration changes with time.
Dynamic fault trees provide ways to analyze the reli-
ability of dynamic systems, but they also cannot escape
from the complexity of modeling fault trees which is theFig. 1 e Definition of the nodes of the reliability graphwith gener
(D) a general purpose node.aforementioned shortcoming of the conventional static
fault tree. In addition, it is not easy for dynamic fault trees
to concurrently handle both dynamic features: sequen-
tially dependent failures and operation mode changes with
time.
Shin and Seong [11,12] developed a convenient dynamic
modeling method using the RGGG by adding dynamic nodes
(FDEP, Spare, PAND nodes) for the qualitative and quantitative
analysis of dynamic systems whose failures depend on the
failure sequence of the subcomponents. The RGGG is an
improved reliability graph model developed for the intuitive
modeling of a target system from its functional block diagram
and paves the way for a convenient reliability analysis of
complex systems [5].
In this paper, a reliability estimation method using the
RGGG is proposed for an analysis of dynamic systems
that have various operation modes with time by intro-
ducing a reliability matrix for the RGGG. The proposed
method provides convenient and intuitive modeling of
configuration changes of complex systems. In addition,
both the dynamic features of sequentially dependent
failures and operation mode changes can be analyzed at
once using the dynamic nodes developed in works of Shin
and Seong [11,12] in combination with the reliability
matrix.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The
second section introduces briefly the RGGG and the dynamic
fault tree with house events. The third section proposes the
RGGGwith a reliability matrix and explains how to utilize the
reliability matrix in the RGGG for the various cases of
configuration changes. The fourth section shows the appli-
cability of the proposed method through an application to a
simple electrical system that has various operation modes
then, the reliability of a shutdown cooling system in a nu-
clear power plant is estimated using the RGGG with dynamic
nodes and the reliability matrix in the fifth section. The sixthal gates. (A) OR node; (B) AND node; (C) k-out-of-n node; and
















r1A þ r2A e r1Ar2A r1A r2A 0
yA ¼ 0
(success)
1 e (r1A þ r2A e r1Ar2A) 1 e r1A 1 e r2A 1
yi: output of node i.
rij: reliability of arc from node i to node j.
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proposed method.2. Background
This section explains the RGGGmethod that is the basis of this
study and the dynamic fault tree with house events developed
to handle various operation modes.2.1. RGGG
The reliability graph is an intuitive method of a reliability
analysis that is able to model a system using a one-to-one
match graph [13,14]. However, reliability graphs are not
widely used because they have a low capability of expression;
they can only express the characteristics of an OR gate. To
overcome the limited capability of expression, the RGGG was
proposed with additional general gates (nodes). The RGGG
suffers no loss of intuitiveness and has the advantages of a
conventional reliability graph. Fig. 1 shows the general nodes
(OR, AND, k-out-of-n, and a general purpose node) that are
utilized in the RGGG.
To calculate the system reliability through the RGGG, the
RGGG is converted into an equivalent Bayesian network byFig. 2 e A dynamic fault tree with housdetermining the probability tables of all the nodes. A
Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical model that
represents a set of random variables and their conditional
dependencies, and it has been used for a reliability analysis
of complex systems [15,16]. For example, Table 1 shows the
probability table of an OR node nA with two inputs from
node n1 and n2 in the RGGG. A detailed explanation of how
to construct a probability table for each node can be found
in works of Kim and Seong [5]. In addition to expressing the
OR, AND, and k-out-of-n gates, a gate with any character-
istic can be expressed by determining the corresponding
probability table.
The failure scenario of a target system can be modeled
with an RGGG that has a very similar shape to the real system
and the signal flow or fluid flow can be expressed very intu-
itively in the RGGG. In conclusion, as the RGGG can be con-
structed directly from the real structure or functional block
diagram of the target system and represent a signal flow
intuitively, it has many merits in analyzing the reliability of
complex systems. The calculation result of the RGGG does
not have truncation errors that generally occur in the mini-
mal cut set (MCS) based fault tree analyzing complex sys-
tems. The RGGG has been used in various ways [17e19] and
was recently improved to analyze the reliability of dynamic
systems whose failures depend on the failure sequence of
the subcomponents [11,12].2.2. Dynamic fault tree with house events
To extend the conventional fault tree with the time re-
quirements and evaluate the actual time dependent profile of
nuclear power plant risk, a dynamic fault tree with house
events was developed by Cepin and Mavko [10]. The house
events are used primarily to switch on and off the respective
parts of the integrated fault tree. The house events table is
introduced to document which house events are switched on
and off for a certain fault tree top event to suit its respective
function event in its appropriate scenario branch. Cepin and
Mavko utilized house events to extend the classic fault tree
with time. The input of the house events status is achieved
through the house events matrix:e events for an equipment outage.
Fig. 3 e Modification of the structure of the reliability graph with general gates and the probability table.






















MHST refers to the house eventsmatrix andHst refers to the
house event value (true or false) for house event s at time t.
The house events matrix is a representation of house events
switched on and off through the discrete points of time. The
number of rows in the house events matrix represents a
number of those house events in the model, and the number
of columns represents the number of time periods in which
mutually different system configurations exist. The quanti-
tative analysis is achieved by finding the minimal cut sets of
fault trees in each time point. Fig. 2 shows a use of the house
events matrix in the modeling of an equipment outage. The
house event under an OR gate serves to model an outage of
equipment modeled in a gate or basic event under the
mentioned OR gate. With house event 1 (H1) set to 1 (true),
gate 1 (G1) is 1 (true) independent of basic event 1 (B1), which
indicates the outage of equipment modeled in B1. The time
diagram explains the house events matrix that simulates the
outage of equipment modeled in B1 for time points T2 and T3.
The main advantage of the dynamic fault tree with house
events is that no additional knowledge of other methods is
needed; only the use of the conventional fault tree is
extended. The existing fault tree models can be used andFig. 4 e Change in the numberupdated with the additional house events, which enable dis-
tinguishing configurations in their respective time points. In
addition, applications of the dynamic fault tree include opti-
mization of parameters in probabilistic models to minimize
the overall risk, such as the configuration control.3. RGGG with reliability matrix
The dynamic fault tree was proposed by introducing house
events and a house events matrix to the conventional fault
tree, but the fault tree itself has a shortcoming in regards to
the difficulty in modeling complex systems. In this section,
the conventional RGGG, which is an intuitive graphical
modeling method, is extended to handle various operation
modes. For a reliability analysis of the dynamic systems
whose configuration changes according to various operation
modes with time, more than one or even many conventional
RGGGs are required in proportion to the number of operation
modes. If the structure of the RGGG changes, the probability
table of each node also should be modified according to the
failure mechanism of each operation mode for quantitative
reliability estimation. For example, as shown in Fig. 3, if the
trip logic of a control system in a nuclear power plant is
changed from 2-out-of-3 voting logic to 1-out-of-2 due to a
surveillance test, the structure of the RGGG for the control
system should be revised according to each operation mode
including the probability table of the node nD.of inputs to the OR node.
Table 4 e Probability table for the OR node in Period 3 of
Fig. 4.
yA ¼ 1 yA ¼ 0
yC ¼ 1 r12 0
yC ¼ 0 1 e r12 1
Table 3 e Probability table for the OR node in Period 2 of
Fig. 4.
yA ¼ 1 yA ¼ 0
yB ¼ 1 yB ¼ 0 yB ¼ 1 yB ¼ 0
yC ¼ 1 r12 r12 0 0
yC ¼ 0 1 e r12 1 e r12 1 1
Table 2 e Probability table for the OR node in Period 1 of
Fig. 4.
yA ¼ 1 yA ¼ 0
yB ¼ 1 yB ¼ 0 yB ¼ 1 yB ¼ 0
yC ¼ 1 r11 þ r21 e r11r21 r11 R21 0
yC ¼ 0 1 e (r11 þ r21 e r11r21) 1 e r11 1 e r21 1
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dynamic fault tree to reflect several fault trees, a reliability
matrix is proposed for one RGGG to express various system
operationmodes varyingwith time. To keep the advantage of
the RGGG method to model a system by using a one-to-one
match graph from the functional block diagram, additional
nodes functioning as the house events in the dynamic fault
tree are not employed in the RGGG. Only the reliabilitymatrix
is newly introduced to the conventional RGGG to handle the
changes of the operation modes. The reliability matrix for
the arcs in the RGGG has a very similar shape to the house
eventsmatrix in the dynamic fault tree, and is constructed as
follows:Fig. 5 e Change in the number






















The variable rnt in the reliability matrix refers to the reli-
ability of arc an at time t. The variables N and T refer to the
number of arcs and time periods, respectively. Therefore, the
number of rows in the matrix represents a number of arcs in
the RGGG that are modeling various operation modes as a
function of time. The number of columns represents the
number of time periods in which mutually different system
configurations exist. By determining the reliability of each arc
according to the system configuration during each period, the
various operation modes varying with time can be modeled
with one RGGG. In other words, the change of arc probabilities
has the same effect as modifying the structure of the RGGG
and the probability tables in the RGGG. The following sections
describe how to utilize the reliability matrix in the RGGG for
various cases of the configuration changes in detail.3.1. Change in the number of inputs
The reliability matrix can be used for the RGGG to express a
component that is not considered during a certain period for a
reason such as routine maintenance. As shown in Fig. 4, it is
assumed that the equipment modeled in arc a2 which is an
input of the OR node is not considered in the model during
Period 2. The probability table for node nC during Period 1 is
shown in Table 2. If r11 and r21 in Table 2 are revised into r12
and 0 respectively, the probability table is changed into
Table 3, which describes node nC during Period 2. As the
probabilities in Table 3 have no relation to the output of node
nB, the probability table is the same as Table 4, which is for the
OR node with one input during Period 2. That is, the reliability
of a component, which is not considered during a certainof inputs to the AND node.
-out-of-3 and change back to 2-out-of-4.
Table 5 e Probability table for the 2-out-of-4 node i Period 1 of Fig. 6.
yA 1 0
yB 1 0 1 0
yC 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
yD 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
yE ¼ 1 r1r2r3r4 þ (1  r1)r2r3r4 þ r1(1  r2)r3r4 þ
r1r2(1  r3)r4 þ r1r2r3(1  r4) þ
(1  r1)(1  r2)r3r4 þ (1  r1)r2(1  r3)r4 þ
(1  r1)r2r3(1  r4) þ r1(1  r2)(1  r3)r4 þ
r1(1  r2)r3(1  r4) þ r1r2(1  r3)(1  r4)
r1r2r3




(1  r1)r2r4 þ






r1r3 r1r4 0 r2r3r4 þ
(1  r2)r3r4 þ
r2(1  r3)r4 þ
r2r3(1  r4)
r2r3 r2r4 0 r3r4 0 0 0
yE ¼ 0 1  {r1r2r3r4 þ (1  r1)r2r3r4 þ r1(1  r2)r3r4 þ
r1r2(1  r3)r4 þ r1r2r3(1  r4) þ
(1  r1)(1  r2)r3r4 þ (1  r1)r2(1  r3)r4 þ
(1  r1)r2r3(1  r4) þ r1(1  r2)(1  r3)r4 þ
r1(1  r2)r3(1  r4) þ r1r2(1  r3)(1  r4)}
1  {r1 3 þ
(1  )r2r3 þ
r1(1 r2)r3 þ
r1r2( r3)}
1  {r1r2r4 þ
(1  r1)r2r4 þ
r1(1  r2)r4 þ
r1r2(1  r4)}




1  r1r3 1  r1r4 1 1  {r2r3r4 þ
(1  r2)r3r4 þ
r2(1  r3)r4 þ
r2r3(1  r4)}
1  r2r3 1  r2r4 1 1  r3r4 1 1 1
Table 6 e Probability table for the 2-out-of-3 node i Period 2 of Fig. 6.
yA 1 0
yB 1 0 1 0
yC 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
yD 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
yE ¼ 1 r1r2r3 + (1  r1)r2r3 + r1(1  r2)r3 + r1r2(1  r3) r1r2r3 + (1  r1)r2r3 + r1(1  r2)r3 + r1r2(1  r3) r1r2 r1r2 r1r3 r1r3 0 0 r2r3 r2r3 0 0 0 0 0 0
yE ¼ 0 1  {r1r2r3 + (1  r1)r2r3 + r1(1  r2)r3 + r1r2(1  r3)} {r1r2r3 + (1  r1)r2r3 + r1(1  r2)r3 + r1r2(1  r3)  r1r2 1  r1r2 1  r1r3 1  r1r3 1 1 1  r2r3 1  r2r3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 7 e Probability table for the 2-out-of-3 node w th three inputs.
yA 1 0
yB 1 0 1 0
yC 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
yE ¼ 1 r1r2r3 + (1  r1)r2r3 + r1(1  r2)r3 + r1r2( r3) r1r2 r 0 r2r3 0 0 0
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The reliability matrix for only arc a2 in Fig. 4 is as follows:
kRMatk ¼ k r21 0 r23 k (3)
In a similar manner, the change in the number of inputs to
the AND node can be expressed using the reliability matrix.
Fig. 5 shows that a component modeled in arc a2, which is an
input of AND node, is not considered in the model during
Period 2. The difference with the OR node is that the output of
node nB and the reliability of arc a2 are set to 1 during Period 2,
and thus only arc a1 is considered as an input of node nC. The
reliability matrix only for arc a2 in Fig. 5 is as follows:
kRMatk ¼ k r21 1 r23 k (4)
3.2. Change of k-out-of-n logic
Redundant channels are often employed in standby critical
systems for safety critical applications [20]. The k-out-of-n
logic is a widely adopted configuration for trip signal genera-
tions in nuclear power plants, and the trip logic changes
during surveillance tests such as sensor and channel tests. For
example, a 2-out-of-4 voting system for tripping the reactor
during normal operation becomes either 2-out-of-3 or 1-out-
of-3 logic during a surveillance test of a channel. In other
words, as n decreases to (ne1) during a channel test, k may
remain the same or may decrease to (ke1). In the former case,
the unavailability of the trip system increases compared to the
normal operation mode. In the latter case, the probability of a
spurious trip increases compared to normal operation mode.
The higher unavailability of the trip system is a serious safety-
related defect because the plant may not be protected if the
trip system fails during an emergency condition. The higher
probability of a spurious trip entails high costs for a utility due
to the interruption of plant operation and the expenses
related to the restart of the plant. Since each change of the
voting logic has its merits and faults, the value of k should be
determined under careful consideration of plant safety and
economic feasibility [21].
For the k-out-of-n voting system to operate normally at
least k channels should be in normal state and the failure of
more than (nek) channels leads the voting system to a failure
state. Therefore, for the reliability and availability analysis of a
k-out-of-n voting system, the (nekþ1)-out-of-n gate is used in
the fault tree modeling and k-out-of-n node is utilized in the
RGGG method. The remaining part of this section describes
how the reliability matrix can be applied to each change of
value of k.Fig. 7 e Change of 2-out-of-4 voting logic to 13.2.1. Change from k-out-of-n to k-out-of-(ne1)
If the value of k does not change even though n decreases by 1
due to a channel test, the unavailability of the voting system
increases, while the probability of a spurious operation of the
system decreases. The example voting system shown in Fig. 6
operates with 2-out-of-4 voting logic normally and operates
with 2-out-of-3 voting logic during Period 2 due to a test of the
channel modeled in arc a4. From a reliability standpoint, this
case can be understood as that the channel under testing
breaks down and cannot transmit an operation signal when
needed. In other words, if the channel modeled in arc a4 in
Fig. 6 is assumed to break down during Period 2, at least two
operating signals from the other three channels are needed
for the 2-out-of-4 voting system to operate, which is the same
as the 2-out-of-3 voting system. Therefore, for a reliability
analysis of the voting system, the reliability of the channel
modeled in arc a4 is set to 0 during the test in the reliability
matrix. The reliability matrix only for arc a4 in Fig. 6 is as
follows:
kRMatk ¼ k r41 0 r43 k (5)
The probability table for node nE during Period 1 is shown
in Table 5. The values of t of rnt are omitted in the table for
brevity. If r11, r21, r31, and r41 in Table 5 are revised into r12, r22,
r32, and 0 respectively, the probability table is changed into
Table 6, which describes node nD during Period 2. As the
probabilities in Table 6 have no relation to the output of node
nD, the probability table is the same as Table 7, which is for the
2-out-of-3 node with three inputs.
3.2.2. Change from k-out-of-n to (k-1)-out-of-(n-1)
This case describes the decrease of k by 1 with a decreasing
value of n, which leads to a higher probability of spurious
operation and a lower unavailability of the voting system
compared to the normal operation mode. Fig. 7 shows an
example of a decreasing value of k during a certain period. The
example system operates with 2-out-of-4 voting logic nor-
mally and operates with 1-out-of-3 voting logic during a test of
a channel modeled in arc a4. In this case, from a reliability
standpoint, the decrease of k can be understood as the chan-
nel under testing always transmitting an operating signal
during the test. In other words, if the 2-out-of-4 voting system
in Fig. 7 is assumed to always receive one operating signal
through a channel under testing, only one more signal from
the other three channels is needed for the system to operate,
which is the same as a 1-out-of-3 voting system. Therefore, for
a reliability analysis of the voting system, the output of node-out-of-3 and change back to 2-out-of-4.
Fig. 8 e Reliability graph with general gates for the hypothetical system that has four operating periods.
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1 during the test in the reliability matrix. The reliabilitymatrix
for only arc a4 in Fig. 7 is as follows:
kRMatk ¼ k r41 1 r43 k (6)Fig. 9 e Dynamic fault tree for the hypothetica3.3. Application to a hypothetical system
In this section, the proposed RGGGmethod with the reliability
matrix is applied to model a hypothetical system which has
three operation modes during the total process time. The
RGGG for the system is shown in Fig. 8. Signals flow from leftl system that has four operating periods.
Fig. 10 e An electrical system which has six points of operation mode changes.
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need at least one input signal to generate an output signal and
the component modeled in node nG needs at least two inputs
to generate an output. The system has four operation modes
during the total process time. During Periods 1 and 3, the
system operates normally and the channel modeled in arc a1
is under testing during Period 2. The channelsmodeled in arcs
a3 and a8 are under testing during Period 4 and in the mean-
time the componentmodeled in Node nG has 1-out-of-2 voting
logic. For a reliability analysis of the system using fault tree
modeling, each operation mode should be described by each
fault tree, but only one dynamic fault tree with house eventsTable 8 e Description of the probabilities for the
component in the electrical system.
Parameter Value Description
PB 0.9 Probability that the battery works
normally
PP 0.1 Probability that a switch is
prematurely closed
PS 0.7 Probability that a switch becomes
closed normally
PL 0.8 Probability that a light bulb starts
to work normally
lL 0.001/hr Probability of failure per hr of a
light bulb during lightingand a house events matrix can be used for describing all the
operationmodes as shown in Fig. 9. The basic event ai in Fig. 9
refers to a failure of the channelmodeled in arc ai. The various
system operation modes during the total process time can
also be modeled using the RGGG shown in Fig. 8 which rep-
resents the normal operation mode by utilizing the proposed
reliability matrix. The reliability matrix for the example sys-








r11 0 r13 r14
r31 r32 r33 0








The rows for the channels that are not affected by the
change of operationmode are omitted in the reliabilitymatrix.
As the channel modeled in arc a1 is not considered in the
system during Period 2 due to a channel test and arc a1 is anFig. 11 e A novel node for a switch which could be
prematurely closed.
Table 9 e Probability table for the node of the switch
which could be prematurely closed.
yA ¼ 1 yA ¼ 0
yP ¼ 1 yP ¼ 0 yP ¼ 1 yP ¼ 0
yS ¼ 1 1 PS 0 0
yS ¼ 0 0 1 e PS 1 1
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matrix. By the same logic, the value of r34 is set to 0 in the
reliability matrix. During Period 4, with a test of the channel
modeled in arc a8, the voting logic of the component modeled
in node nG changes from k-out-of-n to (ke1)-out-of-(ne1).
Therefore, the value of r84 is set to 1 in the reliabilitymatrix. In
conclusion, the reliabilities of the example system, which has
four operating periods with three operation modes, can be
estimated by the one RGGG in Fig. 8 and the reliability matrix
in Eq. (7). In other words, the revision of the RGGG structureFig. 12 e The reliability graph with general gates wand the probability tables according to each operation mode
are unnecessary. Furthermore, the actual structure and signal
flows in the system are easily comprehensible from the RGGG
compared to the fault tree with house events as shown in Figs.
9 and 10.4. Applicability of the proposed method
The RGGG method provides a convenient graphical
modeling from functional block diagrams of complex sys-
tems including a quantitative reliability estimation using
Bayesian networks. One of the advantages of the RGGG is a
wide applicability to various systems by utilizing general
nodes with adequate probability tables that represent sys-
tem failure logic. In other words, a node in the RGGG can be
used to describe various causal relations between events
that are not limited to OR and AND relations. In this section,
the applicability of the proposed RGGG with a reliabilityith a reliability matrix for the electrical system.
Fig. 13 e Evaluation result of the electrical system at Time Point 6.
Nu c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 8 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 3 8 6e4 0 3396matrix is verified by applying a simple electrical system
which was treated by Matsuoka and Kobayashi [6] using the
GO-FLOW method.
The electrical system shown in Fig. 10 has six time points
at which the operation mode changes. Time Point 1 is the
initial time the battery is connected at Time Point 2. Switch S1
is required to be closed at Time Point 3, and Time Point 4 is 10
hours after Time Point 3. At Time Point 5, which immediately
succeeds Time Point 4, Switch S2 is required to be closed and
Time Point 6 is 10 hours after Time Point 5. Table 8 explains
the probabilities for the components in the electrical system.
The probabilities of PP and PS apply to both Switches 1 and 2,
and the probabilities of PL and lL apply to both Lights 1 and 2.
The switches in the system could be prematurely closed
before the closure requirement with a probability of Pp. As the
existing nodes such as OR andANDnodes cannot describe this
logic, a novel node for the switches is developed as shown in
Fig. 11. Node nA has an output of 1when it transmits a flow of
electricity to the switch; otherwise, it has an output of 0. The
node “Preclosed” has an output of 1 when the switch is pre-
maturely closed before the requirement to be closed, and hasTable 10 e Evaluation results at all the time points.
Reliability of the electrical system
Time Point 1 0
Time Point 2 0.13824
Time Point 3 0.55555
Time Point 4 0.55044
Time Point 5 0.74177
Time Point 6 0.73738an output of 0when the switch is not closed prematurely. The
probability table for the node of the switch in Fig. 11 can be
determined in Table 9. If the switch is prematurely closed
when an electrical current is transmitted from Node nA (yA¼1
and yP¼1), the probability that the current passes the switch is
1. On the other hand, if the switch is not prematurely closed
when a current is transmitted from node nA (yA¼1 and yP¼0),
the probability that the current passes the switch is the same
as the probability that the switch becomes closed at that time
(PS). With the developed nodes for the switches that can be
prematurely closed, the RGGG for the electrical system is
constructed with a reliability matrix as shown in Fig. 12. The
RGGG is for estimating the probability that at least one light
bulb is lit at each time point. As a light bulb has the probability
of “Start to light” in addition to the failure probability during
lighting, the node “Start to light” is used and the connected
light bulb starts towork onlywhen both inputs from the nodes
“Switch” and “Start to light” are available. The reliability ma-
trix for the system is determined according to the operation
mode during each operation period, and the rows for the
nodes, which are not affected by the change of operation
mode, are omitted in the reliability matrix shown in Fig. 12.
The quantitative analysis to estimate the reliability of the
electrical systemat each time point is conducted usingMSBNx
which is a noncommercial software tool for evaluating
Bayesian networks [22]. A screenshot of the evaluation result
at Time Point 6 using the MSBNx is shown in Fig. 13. The
probability that at least one light bulb is lit appears in the OR
node and the probability that each light bulb is lit is shown in
the node for each light bulb. The evaluation results at all time
points are shown in Table 10 and the results are the same as
that of the GO-FLOW method [6].
Fig. 14 e Simplified diagram for the shutdown cooling system. CSS, containment spray system; LPSI, low pressure safety
injection.
Fig. 15 e Upper part of the fault tree for the shutdown cooling system. SCS, shutdown cooling system; SDC, shutdown
cooling.
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Fig. 16 e Spare nodes for dynamic reliability graph with
general gates. (A) Original spare node. (B) Modified spare
node.
Fig. 17 e Simplified dynamic reliability graph with general gates
OM, operation mode.
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Cooling System
A nuclear power plant during the low power and shutdown
(LPSD) period experiences various plant configurations and
operational states [23]. There has been few probabilistic safety
assessments (PSAs) for a whole LPSD period since the difficulty
and cost for these assessments are considerable when
comparedwithaPSAat full-powermode.AwholeLPSDperiod is
usually partitioned with several plant operational states (POSs)
in which it is usually assumed that a nuclear power plant in a
single POS has identical system configurations. For a detailed
risk calculation, the POSs needed in the LPSD period may be
increased to almost 20 POSs. In this section, the reliability of a
shutdown cooling system (SCS) that has various operation
modes during the LPSD period is analyzed using the proposed
dynamic RGGG with a reliability matrix and dynamic nodes.
5.1. Dynamic behaviors of a shutdown cooling system
The function of the SCS is residual heat removal after a reactor
shutdown. If the safety function of the SCS fails, then the
coolant in the reactor vesselwill boil and the nuclear fuelmight
be damaged. The SCS consists of two trains, and each train has
enough capability for cooling the residual heat. The simplifiedfor each operation mode of the shutdown cooling system.
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phase, there are five system configurations for the SCS [23].
- CONF1: Normal (Train A and B standby)
- CONF2: Train A operation (Train B standby)
- CONF3: Train B operation (Train A overhaul)
- CONF4: Train A operation (Train B overhaul)
- CONF5: Train B operation (Train A standby)
The fault tree shown in Fig. 15 is used to evaluate the un-
availability of the SCS and a postprocessing method and
condition gates [24] are commonly applied according to each
system configuration. When both Train A and Train B are on
standby, as the SCS becomes unavailable if both trains fail
during standby status, the static AND gate is able to describe
the relations between the failures of Train A and Train B.
When one train is operating and the other train is being
overhauled, as the SCS is unavailable if the operating train
fails, the failure of the SCS can be modeled using the static
AND gate adopting postprocessing methods or conditioning
methods. However, when one train is operating and the other
train is on standby, the failure of the SCS cannot be described
accurately using the static AND relation between the failure of
the operating train and the failure of the standby train. If the
operating train fails, the standby train enters operating status
and the failure rates of the components become higher
compared to the standby status. As the standby train might
fail either during standby status or operating status, the fail-
ure sequence of two trains and the state transition of the
standby train should be considered. Therefore, a dynamic gate
is necessary to exactly model the failure of the SCS during the
CONF2 and CONF5, and the failure of substituting the failed
train with the standby train should also be considered.Fig. 18 e Simplified dynamic reliability graph with general gates
HEP, human error probability; OM, operation mode.5.2. Dynamic spare node combined with reliability
matrix
The dynamic fault trees [9,10] have some limitations to
analyze the dynamic aspects in the failure of the SCS in the
following areas. First, the dynamic fault tree does not provide
a dynamic gate that is able to describe the redundancy
concept explained in the previous section. The states of the
components in the standby train change from the standby
status to the operating status simultaneously when a problem
arises in the operating train. As the spare gate of the dynamic
fault tree accepts only the basic events as inputs, it cannot
model the redundancymechanism inwhich a train composed
of various valves and pumps is on standby for the other train
which is also composed of various components. Second, the
backup components under the dynamic gate of the dynamic
fault tree substitute for themain component if they do not fail
before the failure of the main component. In other words, the
failures of substituting a failed train that might be caused by
human operators cannot be considered. Last, the dynamic
fault tree does not provide a solution to simultaneously
analyze the redundancy mechanisms and operation mode
changes of the SCS.
In this section, how to apply the proposed dynamic RGGG
to the reliability analysis of the SCS is explained. The reli-
ability matrix is utilized to model various operation modes
with one RGGG, and the dynamic spare node [11,12] is used to
describe the redundancy mechanism of the SCS. Three oper-
ation modes of the SCS are assumed for simplicity.
- OM1: Both Train A and Train B are on standby.
- OM2: One train is operating and the other train is on
standby.with a reliability matrix for the shutdown cooling system.
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lable due to an overhaul.
The dynamic spare node [11,12] has one primary input and
spare inputs with a dormancy factor (a). It generates a failure
output when the primary input and all the spare inputs fail.
The dormancy factor is defined as the ratio of the failure rate
in standby status to the failure rate in operating status. If the
dormancy factor is 1, the failure rate in standby mode is equal
to the failure rate in operational mode, and if the dormancy
factor is zero, the corresponding component never fails in
standby mode. The spare node is modified to express the dy-
namic redundancy mechanisms of the SCS in this study. The
original spare node [11,12] and the modified spare node are
shown in Fig. 16. The principle reason for modifying the
original spare node is to conveniently model the dynamic re-
lations that a problem in the operating train affects all the
components in the standby train. The component modeled in
the modified spare node n2 in Fig. 16B becomes an operatingFig. 19 e Dynamic reliability graph with general gates for the shu
error probability; OM, operation mode; SCS, shutdown coolingstatus when there is no input signal from the main compo-
nent (train) modeled in node n1. The algorithm to make the
probability table for the spare node [11,12] is also modified to
be suitable for the modified spare node.
To analyze three operation modes using one RGGG model,
a reliability matrix is used and the dormancy factor used in
the spare nodes also varies according to the reliability matrix
as the operation mode changes. Fig. 17 shows simplified
RGGGs for each operation mode. The spare nodes with a
dormancy factor are used tomodel OM2,while dynamic nodes
are not necessary for OM1 and OM3. Three RGGGs in Fig. 17
can be integrated into one RGGG with a reliability matrix as
shown in Fig. 18. The node of Operator is used to express the
failure to substitute the failed train with the standby train. If
the operator fails to substitute for the failed train of the SCS,
the SCS loses the ability to remove the residual heat even
though there is no fault in the standby train. The human error
probability (HEP) represents the probability of a substitution
failure and it is used to quantify the node of Operator. The firsttdown cooling system and estimation results. HEP, human
system.
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represent the dormancy factors and failure probability of the
Operator node for each operation mode, and the other rows
are for the failure rates of the subcomponents of the SCS. If the
dormancy factor and HEP are set to 1 and 0, respectively, as
shown in the reliability matrix, the RGGG in Fig. 18 becomes
the same as the RGGG for OM1 in Fig. 17. If the HEP is set to 1,
as Train B is never able to substitute for Train A, the RGGG in
Fig. 18 becomes the same as the RGGG for OM3 in Fig. 17.5.3. Dynamic RGGG model for shutdown cooling system
The shutdown cooling system shown in Fig. 14 can be
modeled as a dynamic RGGG shown in Fig. 19. The spare nodes
described above are used to model the redundancy mecha-
nism during OM2. Using the reliability matrix to define
changes of the failure rates, the dormancy factor, and HEP
according to each operation mode, one dynamic RGGG model
shown in Fig. 19 is able to include all the operationmodes. The
reliability of the SCS during OM1 estimated from the dynamic
RGGG is the same as the estimation result from the static fault
tree for OM1 shown in Fig. 20.Fig. 20 e Static fault tree for the shutdown cooling system. STable 11 compares the estimation results for OM 2
assuming no human error (HEP ¼ 0) from the dynamic RGGG
with those from the static fault tree as the dormancy factor
changes. Since the static fault tree cannot consider the dy-
namic status changes of Train B from standby status to
operating status, the estimation results become more inac-
curate as the dormancy factor becomes smaller. That is
because the smaller dormancy factor implies bigger differ-
ences between the failure rates of the components in Train B
under standby status and operating status.
The dynamic RGGG model for the SCS has a very similar
shape with the actual structure of the SCS shown in Fig. 14.
Therefore, from the graphic display of the RGGG, it is very easy
to see the system failure modes and ascertain the important
events that cause a system failure and the effects of the events
on the system reliability. For example, during OM2, the failure
of substituting a failed train with a standby train might have a
significant effect on the reliability of the SCS, and can be
inferred easily from the RGGG model. The HEP for the train
substitution can be reduced when there is a supervisor or an
automated operator support system. To investigate the effect
of the variation of substituting error probability on unreli-
ability of the SCS, the probabilities of 0.01, 0.005, and 0.001 areCS, shutdown cooling system; SDC, shutdown cooling.
Table 12 e Unreliability changes according to the change
of human error probability (Operation Mode 2).
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HEP, human error probability; SCS, shutdown cooling system.6. Discussion
The fault tree analysis is the most widely used method in the
risk assessment of nuclear power plants and for the modeling
of the change of operation modes and failure criteria. The
dynamic fault tree has been developed by adopting house
events and a house events matrix. The dynamic fault tree
provides magnificent ways to analyze the risk of dynamic
systems, but since modeling fault trees for complex systems
with complicated conditions is a very cumbersome task, it
might cause errors in the construction of fault trees. There-
fore, this study was conducted to propose a convenient
modeling method for the reliability analyses of complex dy-
namic systems that have various operation modes varying
with time. The RGGG method is improved because it is an
advanced reliability graph model that was developed for the
intuitive modeling of a target system from its functional block
diagram and paves the way for the convenient reliability
analysis of complex systems. To describe various operation
modes varying with time by one RGGG, a novel concept of a
reliability matrix is proposed with an explanation of how to
utilize the reliability matrix in the RGGG for the various cases
of configuration changes.
If a system has several operation modes and the system
failure criterion changes during a certain process time, the
number of conventional RGGGs required for the reliability
analysis is the same as the number of operation modes. In
addition, the probability tables used in the RGGG has to be
modified according to the structure of the RGGG for the
quantitative analyses. However, with the proposed reliability
matrix, one RGGG is able to involve various conventional
RGGGs. In addition, the replacement of the reliabilities of the
components according to the reliability matrix has the same
effect as changing the numerical expressions in the proba-
bility tables. Therefore, the probability tables of the nodes in
the RGGG do not have to be modified as the system operation
mode changes, and it could relieve difficulty in modeling
various operation modes. Furthermore, the sequence-
dependent failures and various change of operation modes
can be analyzed at once using the dynamic nodes in combi-
nation with the reliability matrix. The reliability of an SCS
which has various operation modes during the LPSD periodTable 11 e Comparison of the estimation results between
a dynamic reliability graphwith general gates and a static
fault tree (Operation Mode 2).
Dormancy factor Unreliability of SCS
Dynamic RGGG Static fault tree
a ¼ 1 1.241Ee03 1.241Ee03
a ¼ 0.5 6.318Ee04 6.210Ee04
a ¼ 0.1 1.437Ee04 1.243Ee04
RGGG, reliability graph with general gates; SCS, shutdown cooling
system.can be analyzed using the proposed dynamic RGGG with dy-
namic nodes and reliability matrix. The dynamic redundancy
mechanism which considers the substitution failure and
various operationmodes of the SCS can be analyzed with only
one dynamic RGGG. In addition, as many kinds of logic be-
tween the events which have even multiple states can be
modeled intuitively with one node in the RGGG method by
defining the appropriate probability tables, the proposed
method has wide applicability to various failure mechanisms,
while a limited function such as OR and AND logics and binary
states are provided in the fault tree analysis.
The RGGGmethod is an intuitive and convenient graphical
modeling method especially for complex systems and by uti-
lizing the reliability matrix, the dynamical system behavior
and time-dependent system reliability also can be easily
analyzed. However, the shortcoming of the RGGG method is
that it is not able to produceminimal cut sets that describe the
combinations of component failures that cause a system
failure. As the minimal cut sets are important information for
a system's safe operation and provide some insight into the
system behavior, it is one of the most valuable outcomes of
the fault tree analysis. That is, as each method has its own
peculiar features and advantages, reliability analysis methods
should be chosen or used together depending on the proper-
ties of the target system and the analysis purpose by taking
account of each method's advantages.Conflicts of interest
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